The performance of hedge fund indices  by Atilgan, Yigit et al.
Available online at www.sciencedirect.comBorsa _Istanbul Review
Borsa _Istanbul Review 13 (2013) 30e52
http://www.elsevier.com/journals/borsa-istanbul-review/2214-8450The performance of hedge fund indices
Yigit Atilgan a,*, Turan G. Bali b,1, K. Ozgur Demirtas a,2
a School of Management, Sabanci University, Orhanli, Tuzla 34956, Istanbul, Turkey
bMcDonough School of Business, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057, United StatesAbstractThis paper investigates the performance of various strategy-specific and composite hedge fund indices. Given the flexible and nonlinear
investment mandates of hedge funds, various risk metrics that take factors such as extreme events and losses with respect to previous peaks are
considered. Our analysis compares the risk-adjusted performances of hedge fund indices among themselves, with respect to the overall equity
market and over time. Special attention is given to the distinction between investable and non-investable hedge fund indices. We find that the
risk-adjusted performances of most hedge fund indices deteriorate over time. Although many hedge fund indices outperform a broad equity
index in the full sample period, most hedge fund indices have highly negative returns during market downturns which sheds suspicion over the
diversification benefits of investing hedge funds. We also find that non-investable indices are superior performers with respect to their investable
counterparts. Finally, the comparison of performance among various indices has little dependence on which particular risk metric is used.
Copyright  2013, Borsa _Istanbul Anonim Şirketi. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Hedge funds are private pools of capital in the sense that
ownership claims in a hedge fund are not traded in organized
exchanges and fund investors benefit from appreciations in the
market value of a hedge fund’s asset portfolio. Hedge funds
present investment opportunities which provide risk and return
combinations that are different from traditional equity and
fixed income investments and they also vary significantly
among themselves in terms of investment strategy, risk and
return characteristics. In this study, our goal is to provide a
detailed account of how various strategy-specific or composite* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ90 (216) 483 9663; fax: þ90 (216) 483 9699.
E-mail addresses: yatilgan@sabanciuniv.edu (Y. Atilgan), tgb27@
georgetown.edu (T.G. Bali), ozgurdemirtas@sabanciuniv.edu (K.O. Demirtas).
Peer review under responsibility of Borsa _Istanbul Anonim Şirketi
Production and hosting by Elsevier
1 Tel.: þ1 (202) 687 5388; fax: þ1 (202) 687 4031.
2 Tel.: þ90 (216) 483 9985; fax: þ90 (216) 483 9699.
2214-8450 Copyright  2013, Borsa _Istanbul Anonim Şirketi. Production and hos
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2013.10.007hedge fund indices have performed in the past. In addition to
documenting the distributional properties of hedge fund index
returns, we pay special attention to risk-adjustment. We pre-
sent various risk metrics and compare the risk-adjusted per-
formances of various hedge fund indices both among
themselves and with respect to a broad equity index. We
emphasize the distinction between investable and non-
investable indices and also analyze how hedge fund perfor-
mance has changed over time with a special focus on the
recent global financial crisis.
Technological innovations have revolutionized the hedge
fund industry and contributed to the heterogeneity that had
been already inherent in the business. Despite this heteroge-
neity, it is possible to list some common traits that most hedge
funds share. One of these traits is flexibility which is the main
factor that differentiates hedge funds from more traditional
investment vehicles such as mutual funds. The performance of
mutual funds is measured with respect to a benchmark and
when market benchmarks are plunging in value, it is natural to
expect that mutual fund returns will also go down with these
benchmarks. In contrast, hedge funds claim to focus on ab-
solute returns by their ability to spot relative price discrep-
ancies between multiple securities and exploit theseting by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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focus thanks to their expanded toolbox. Hedge funds do not
face regulatory restrictions regarding the financial instruments
they are allowed to trade or their portfolio compositions.
Unlike traditional investment vehicles, hedge funds can use
derivative instruments such as options and futures and they are
able to bet on price declines by short selling securities.
Moreover, hedge funds have the ability to borrow money to
magnify their returns which is a practice called “leverage”.
The notion of leverage is a double-edge sword and increases
the risks faced by hedge funds since leverage does not only
magnify the gains, but also potential losses. Finally, hedge
funds have fewer obligations compared to mutual funds
regarding their capital adequacies.
Another common feature of hedge funds is that the regu-
latory and tax framework surrounding them is not stringent.
Many hedge funds are registered in off-shore tax havens
around the world and there is not much transparency
regarding their operations. For hedge funds, transparency is
an undesired attribute because funds that take strategic po-
sitions or short sell particular securities would not want their
trades to be known by outsiders. On the other hand, fraud risk
becomes substantial in a lightly regulated industry since in-
vestors are unable to monitor the hedge funds using con-
ventional methods. Even if the investors are suspicious about
fraud, they cannot just take their money and leave the crime
scene due to restrictions for redeeming capital in the hedge
fund business.
This brings us to the issue of illiquidity. Hedge funds are
not liquid investments. Even the wealthiest institutions and
individuals need to wait for specific dates or time windows
before they can subscribe to hedge funds since most funds do
not let investors in on an ongoing basis. More importantly,
investors cannot redeem their invested capital from the hedge
funds whenever they desire. There are lock-up periods which
correspond to minimum amounts of time that an investor is
required to keep his or her money invested in a hedge fund
before the investor is allowed to withdraw capital. Even when
the investors are allowed to redeem their money, there are
certain conditions that need to be satisfied. Redemption pe-
riods are often set at the end of fiscal quarters but they can
even be less frequent. Moreover, an advance notice up to three
months should be given to the hedge fund before the
redemption. The rationale behind the illiquidity of hedge fund
investments is that these provisions enable hedge fund man-
agers to invest freely in illiquid assets. Illiquid assets may turn
out to be very profitable investments but they may require a
long-horizon focus because it may take time before the profits
can be realized. Many valuable investment opportunities in
financial markets are not compatible with the idea that hedge
funds should maintain continuous liquidity for their clients. In
a liquid world, hedge funds would have had to maintain cash
reserves as liquidity buffers and since cash generally earns
lower expected returns compared to riskier investments, this
would hurt a hedge fund’s overall performance. Another
drawback of liquidity is related to the adverse impact of early
withdrawers on existing fund investors because potential assetsales could spur additional transaction costs which would be
borne by existing clients.
The expensive fee structure underlying hedge funds is also
a common feature. Hedge funds charge their clients an annual
operating fee typically about 2% of assets under management
just like mutual funds, but on top of this, hedge funds also
impose additional performance or incentive fees that are
generally about 20% of fund returns. This “2 plus 20” formula
is common in the industry and it is possible to encounter
performance fees that are even higher and reach half the gains
generated by the hedge fund. This type of fee structure may
not always justify the returns generated by fund managers
even if the gross returns are higher than the ones generated by
traditional money management vehicles. The rationale behind
this fee structure is that hedge funds try to attract the brightest
minds and the best talent to their businesses by compensating
their managers based heavily on their success. The drawback
is that this type of reward system is asymmetric and fund
managers receive a portion of the profits but they do not share
the portfolio losses. As a result, hedge fund managers may
take too many risks in their investment decisions. A protection
against extravagant fund fees is the high water mark system
which means that hedge fund managers can charge perfor-
mance fees only after the hedge fund surpasses its historical
peak.
Mutual funds can be passively or actively managed, but
hedge fund managers are active by definition. Hedge funds are
in the business of chasing after arbitrage opportunities. In
today’s financial markets where arbitrage opportunities are
short-lived and fleeting, the notion of buy-and-hold is
incompatible with the nature of hedge funds. Therefore,
portfolio turnover is very high for many hedge funds and
trading costs such as bid-ask spreads, commissions paid to the
brokers and stock borrowing costs can amount to about 5% of
portfolio value on average. The performance of hedge funds
can be either beta or alpha driven. A beta driven hedge fund
exposes itself to some market or macroeconomic risk and
hopes to get compensated for this risk. For hedge funds, on top
of traditional sources of beta such as equity market and bond
market performance, there are also alternative sources of alpha
such as liquidity, volatility, corporate event risk and com-
modity market performance. Alpha represents the abnormal
returns earned by hedge funds that cannot be explained by risk
exposures. In the hedge fund business, alpha comes from
either the regulatory flexibility awarded to hedge funds or the
fund manager’s ability to pick the right securities to invest in
at the right times. The competitive advantage of hedge funds
comes from the ability to collect and analyze information
more efficiently, the valuable human resources that possess
special insights, the low cost access to financial markets and
superior trade execution.
Many investors prefer to park their money in hedge funds
because they believe that they are delegating the management
of their savings to truly skilled professionals. Modern financial
markets present many complex opportunities to talented
players to realize returns. Hedge funds have the required re-
sources such as human capital and computer power to exploit
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generate absolute returns. A side benefit of the nature of the
hedge fund business is that the complex strategies result in
return profiles that have low correlations with traditional
financial instruments. This is important because low correla-
tion implies more diversification benefits and the enhancement
of risk-return profiles for investor portfolios.
The academic literature has given much focus on the topic
of hedge fund performance during the last fifteen years. Fung
and Hsieh (1997) are among the first to investigate hedge fund
and mutual fund returns in an integrated framework. Mutual
funds are investments with relative return targets and studies
that assess the performance of mutual funds generally focus on
the “location” component of returns which relates to the asset
categories that the mutual funds hold in their portfolios. Hedge
funds have an absolute return focus; therefore, prior models
that are used to explain mutual fund returns may be inadequate
to explain hedge fund returns. Motivated by this, Fung and
Hsieh (1997) also look at the “strategy” component of
returns which has to do with what lies under the managers’
investment rationales and the “quantity” component of returns
which has to do with the amount of leverage used. These
additional components or style factors that are added to the
traditional performance attribution models are able to explain
returns generated by dynamic trading strategies that hedge
funds use. In a follow up study, Fung and Hsieh (2001) only
focus on commodity trading advisors (CTAs) which are
directional trend followers by nature and place their bets on
the momentum in asset prices. The authors find that de-
rivatives called lookback straddles can replicate key features
of trend-following strategies and explain CTA returns better
than standard asset indices.
Are hedge funds really superior performers? This question
has been investigated many times in the literature. Although
many studies document one form of superiority for hedge
funds, there has been no shortage of studies which argue that
hedge funds do not generate positive abnormal returns.
Motivated by the advantages of hedge funds such as incentive
alignment and investment flexibility, Ackermann, McEnally,
and Ravenscraft (1999) find that average hedge fund Sharpe
ratios are higher compared to those of mutual funds despite the
fact that hedge funds carry more risk. The authors link these
superior returns to the organizational structures of hedge funds
and show that incentive fees are significant determinants of
risk-adjusted hedge fund returns. Kosowski, Naik, and Teo
(2007) find that superior hedge fund performance cannot be
explained by pure luck since hedge fund performance persists
at annual horizons. Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov
(2010) argue that most of this persistence is driven by top
performers rather than bottom performers enforcing the idea
that managerial talent lies at the root of these findings.
The market timing ability of hedge funds is documented in
Chen and Liang (2007) and this ability is especially pro-
nounced in poor and volatile market conditions. Bali, Brown,
and Caglayan (2011) investigate hedge funds’ exposures to
various financial and macroeconomic risk factors through
alternative measures of factor betas and examines theirperformance in predicting the cross-sectional variation in
hedge fund returns. Their results indicate a significantly pos-
itive (negative) link between default premium beta (inflation
beta) and future hedge fund returns. Another set of evidence
for managerial ability is revealed by Aragon and Martin
(2012) who analyze the annual disclosures of derivatives
holdings made by a subset of hedge funds. The authors find
that the directional and non-directional option positions taken
by hedge funds are reflective of both market timing and
volatility timing behavior. Finally, Sun, Wang, and Zheng
(2012) investigate whether hedge fund managers who pursue
unique investment strategies generate superior performance.
The study argues that the distinctiveness of a hedge fund
measured by the correlation of the fund’s returns with the
average returns of the hedge funds in the same strategy cate-
gory is a robust predictor of better future performance.
There are also studies which question the finding that hedge
funds exhibit performance superiority. Amin and Kat (2003)
calculate generalized versions of Sharpe ratios and find that
hedge funds are inefficient investments and the main benefits
of hedge funds materialize only when they are used as com-
ponents of portfolios due to their weak correlation with market
indices. Griffin and Xu (2009) decompose hedge fund returns
into three components based on the funds’ stock picking,
portfolio rotation and style selection abilities and find that
hedge funds have no competitive advantage. Finally, Dichev
and Yu (2011) argue that actual investor returns are not only
determined by the returns of the portfolios that hedge funds
hold, but also by the timing and magnitude of inflows to and
outflows from hedge funds. Their results show that dollar-
weighted returns that take these factors into account are
significantly lower than returns of corresponding buy-and-hold
strategies.
Another dimension of hedge fund performance is illiquidity
which is manifested by both the nature of the assets that hedge
funds hold and the lock-up and share restrictions that funds
impose on their investors. Aragon (2007) investigates the
relation between hedge fund returns and restrictions that limit
the liquidity of fund investors. The results imply that abnormal
returns of funds of funds with lock-up periods are significantly
higher than those of funds that make it easier for their in-
vestors to redeem capital. Moreover, hedge fund alphas
documented by the prior literature can be explained by such
liquidity restrictions. Sadka (2010) approaches the issue of
liquidity from another angle and estimates the loading of each
hedge fund based on the covariance of returns with an
aggregate liquidity factor. Hedge funds that load significantly
on liquidity risk outperform those that are not exposed to this
type of risk. The rewards to bearing liquidity risk is large and,
therefore, as shown in Teo (2011), hedge funds often take on
more liquidity risk than optimal given their redemption terms.
On a subset of hedge funds that have minimal redemption
restrictions, those funds that expose themselves to more
liquidity risk significantly outperform those funds who invest
more conservatively. Schaub and Schmid (2013) focus on the
global financial crisis of 2008 and find that hedge funds were
not able to manage their illiquid portfolios effectively in the
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liquid funds.
The focus of this study is also hedge fund performance but
we focus especially on the issue of risk adjustment. We find
that hedge fund index returns deviate from normality with high
levels of left-skewness and leptokurtosis due to the non-
linearities inherent in the investment strategies of many
hedge funds. Consequently, we define several risk metrics such
as standard deviation, semi-deviation, value-at-risk and
drawdown to capture different dimensions of investment risk.
Then, we compare the risk-adjusted performances of various
hedge fund strategies both among themselves and with respect
to the overall equity market. There are several major results
that emerge from this analysis. First, most hedge fund indices
experience drops in their risk-adjusted performances over
time. Second, most hedge fund indices do not provide
adequate diversification benefits with respect to traditional
asset classes as they experience big declines in their perfor-
mances in crisis periods. Third, investable indices exhibit
inferior risk-adjusted performances with respect to non-
investable indices. Fourth, a majority of the hedge fund
indices outperform the overall equity market on a risk-adjusted
basis. Finally, the rank ordering of different strategy-specific
hedge fund indices does not change drastically when alterna-
tive risk metrics are used for adjustment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
major types of strategies that hedge funds follow. Section 3
presents specific details about hedge fund index data and sum-
mary statistics for index return distributions. Section 4 reports the
risk-adjusted performances of various hedge fund indices based
on four different risk metrics. Section 5 concludes.
2. Hedge fund strategies
The term hedge fund cannot be described by referring to a
representative hedge fund since a representative hedge fund
does not exist. Some funds take a lot of risk and make
directional bets whereas other funds manage their risks
obsessively and keep their portfolios immune from market
movements. Some hedge funds deal with complex financial
instruments such as credit derivatives whereas other funds
suffice with buying and selling equity shares. Given all this
variety in the hedge fund universe, there is no unanimously
agreed upon categorization that describes the hedge fund. The
data provider that we rely on for the subsequent analysis, Dow
Jones Credit Suisse, distinguishes between 10 major hedge
fund strategies. These are event driven, long/short equity
hedge, equity market neutral, dedicated short bias, convertible
arbitrage, fixed income arbitrage, global macro, emerging
markets, managed futures and multi-strategy. The strategies
that we talk about in this section are by no means an
exhaustive list of all possible hedge fund strategies. Even
weather conditions, film financing or the careers of profes-
sional sports players can provide profit opportunities for hedge
funds. It is important to remember that hedge funds constitute
the frontier of innovation for the financial services industry
and hedge fund strategies are constantly under evolution.Hedge fund managers who follow event driven strategies
seek investment opportunities based on mispricings sur-
rounding a wide variety of corporate events including but not
limited to mergers, acquisitions, spin-offs, restructurings,
share repurchases, tender offers, hostile takeover bids, asset
sales or purchases, legal disputes, financial distress, bank-
ruptcies and liquidations. Analysts need to carry out detailed
bottom-up analysis about companies and industrial sectors to
be able to anticipate and/or manage corporate events. Fund
managers can generate profits if they correctly forecast the
outcome and timing of corporate events. Event driven funds
can invest in combinations of equity and fixed-income in-
struments as well as various derivatives. We will list three
major substrategies under the event driven category, namely,
distressed restructuring, merger/risk arbitrage and multi-
strategy event driven.
Distressed securities can be defined as stocks and bonds of
companies that have defaulted on their obligations and/or filed
for bankruptcy or securities that trade at significant discounts
to their value at issuance. The market values of distressed
securities may not reflect their true values due to illiquidity
related difficulties in the pricing process, inadequate research
coverage, psychological biases of investors or constraints in
the trading behavior of some investor groups. Distressed
restructuring funds follow a special type of event driven
strategy that profits if the issuer improves its financial and/or
operational outlook or exits successfully from the bankruptcy
process. Such strategies require careful financial and legal
analysis. Managers of funds that follow distressed restructur-
ing strategies may get actively involved in the management of
companies by being a part of creditors’ committees. Distressed
restructuring funds generally hold a net long position on dis-
tressed securities, thus from a risk perspective, they suffer
from long bias. Additional risks in holding distressed secu-
rities include liquidity risk, liquidation risk and complications
that can arise during bankruptcy proceedings. Although dis-
tressed restructuring strategies may hold equity exposure, they
primarily focus on debt instruments.
Merger arbitrage or risk arbitrage strategies aim to profit
from opportunities that arise from extraordinary corporate
transactions such as mergers, acquisitions or leveraged buy-
outs. In the case of an acquisition, there is generally a spread
between the value offered by the acquirer and the current
market value of the target due to the winner’s curse. In the case
of a merger, there may be a spread between the actual and
theoretical exchange ratios of the merging entities. Merger
arbitrage funds attempt to identify such spreads and take
directional positions by trading primarily in the equity or eq-
uity related instruments of corporations. Deals underlying
merger arbitrage or risk arbitrage strategies are complicated
and require both an understanding of the economic motives
behind the deal and a proficiency in risk management tech-
niques. Expertise regarding the legal frameworks for these
corporate events is also crucial. The main risk behind these
strategies is that the deal may fail to close or it may close
under terms that are different than those announced initially.
This type of risk is called the transaction risk. There is also the
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impact the fund returns negatively.
Managers of multi-strategy event driven funds construct
their overall portfolios based on a combination of various
event driven sub-strategies. These may also include credit
arbitrage funds that focus mainly on a company’s creditwor-
thiness and use fundamental credit analysis to anticipate
events that trigger changes in the credit quality of issuers or
special situations funds that seek for opportunities in com-
panies that are engaged in announced or anticipated corporate
catalyst events such as security issues and buybacks, acquisi-
tions, asset sales, spin-offs, etc. Multi-strategy funds do not
maintain more than half of their portfolio in a specific event
driven sub-strategy. Such funds benefit from having the flex-
ibility to invest in different asset classes depending on the
specific event that drives a particular strategy and being able to
alter the strategy portfolio according to changes in the business
cycle. Security types include credit instruments that range
from the most senior to the most junior, equity and additional
derivative securities.
Long/short equity hedge strategies establish both long and
short positions primarily in equity related securities. Equity
hedge funds have been active in the markets for decades and
they constitute the fastest growing segment among alternative
investment strategies. Generally, funds that follow equity
hedge strategies aim to set up equity portfolios which profit
from the stock picking abilities of their managers. These funds
generate (lose) money when long positions appreciate
(decrease) in value and short positions decrease (increase) in
value. The main source of return is the performance difference
between the long and short positions and therefore, the equity
hedge strategy is also termed the double alpha strategy where
alpha represents the risk-adjusted abnormal performance of a
strategy. Additional sources of return include the interest
rebate from the proceeds of the short sale used as collateral,
the interest paid by the brokers on the margin deposit and the
difference in the dividend payments between the long and the
short positions. Having a short position in some stocks serves
both to extract value out of overpriced securities and to hedge
the overall fund portfolio against systematic risk. Investment
decisions are made using both quantitative and fundamental
analysis and hedge fund managers have the flexibility to shift
their portfolios between stocks based on their growth, size and
industry attributes. The ability to use both long and short
positions enables hedge funds to generate returns from the
relative price movements of stocks. Although the fund man-
agers may be wrong on their security selection on an absolute
basis, they can still generate money if the long positions
outperform the short positions on a relative basis.
For equity market neutral strategies, the acts of purchasing
and selling stocks become dependent on each other because
these strategies aim to eliminate a fund’s exposure to the
systematic risk inherent in the overall market. In other words,
the fund’s return is driven purely by the stock selection ability
of the fund manager instead. A widely accepted definition of
market neutrality is beta neutrality. Beta is a systematic risk
measure based on the scaled covariance between a security’sreturn and the market return. A hedge fund manager may want
to maintain a beta neutral portfolio with the aim of focusing on
stock selection and not waste resources to forecast aggregate
returns. Beta neutral strategies make money when long posi-
tions go up more rapidly than the value losses from the short
positions in bullish markets. Conversely, when markets are
bearish, these strategies make money when short positions go
down more rapidly than the value losses from the long posi-
tions. Finally, there is the concept of factor neutrality which
takes additional factors beyond the market performance into
account. Some of these factors can be valuation ratios, growth
projections, dividend yields, price momentum, and earnings
revisions. It may be infeasible to make a portfolio perfectly
market neutral at all times because any change in stock prices
will affect the market exposure of the portfolio and continuous
dynamic rebalancing will be necessary. Thus, equity market
neutral strategies typically constrain their long or short market
exposure to be at most 10% of portfolio values.
Funds that follow dedicated short bias strategies employ
quantitative techniques to identify overvalued companies and
take more short positions than long positions. Short sellers
make profits when stock prices decline so that they can
repurchase shares at a cheaper price and return them to their
original owners. Short-biased fund managers differ from
market generalists in that the aim of their analysis is identi-
fying securities that are expected to experience price drops in
the future. The central premise of dedicated short bias stra-
tegies is that most managers in the asset management industry
have a tendency to focus their analysis on identifying under-
valued securities and buy-and-hold opportunities. Moreover,
potential conflicts of interests such as the one experienced by
equity analysts in underwriter firms cause good news to be
reflected in asset prices in a timelier manner compared to bad
news. Consequently, profit opportunities may be relatively
more abundant for short sellers. On the other hand, there are
many risks that are associated with short selling. The downside
risk of short positions is theoretically unlimited, short sellers
are affected adversely by the long-run average positive drift in
equity markets, some exchanges impose restrictions on short
selling and there is the possibility that stock lenders will ask
for their shares back before the short sellers realize their gains.
Moreover, identifying overvalued securities does not guar-
antee success since stock prices may increase even further
before they revert back to their intrinsic values causing addi-
tional losses due to a short squeeze. Short-biased funds
attempt to reduce the risk they undertake by holding some of
their overall portfolios in offsetting long positions and
employing stop-buy strategies in order to reduce their loss
when market prices go up.
Relative value is an umbrella term that is used for invest-
ment strategies that seek to profit from the realization of a
relative valuation discrepancy in the pricing relationship be-
tween multiple securities. The security types that are used in
the implementation of relative value strategies are diverse and
range across equity, debt and derivative securities. The main
difference between relative value strategies and event driven
strategies is that the performance of the former is not
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Convertible arbitrage is one of the most popular relative value
strategies. Convertible securities are debt-like instruments that
carry an option to be converted into equity under pre-specified
terms. Since they provide a potential claim in the stock mar-
ket, they are desired by many investors. From a firm’s
perspective, when a corporation needs outside financing, it
may decide to raise additional capital by issuing convertible
bonds, if the managers believe that their shares are currently
undervalued and want to sell them forward at a premium.
Historically, convertible securities often traded at lower prices
compared to their fair values and the standard arbitrage
strategy involves holding a long position on the convertible
bond and hedging this position by short selling the underlying
common stock. Viewing a convertible bond as a bundle of
multiple securities makes the risks inherent in convertible
arbitrage strategies more transparent. First, there is the interest
rate risk associated with the bond component. Second, there is
the equity risk underlying the option component. Third, there
is the credit risk of the convertible issuer. Other risks include
the risk of special events such as dividend payouts, the risk of
the widening of bid/ask spreads between a convertible bond
and the underlying share, aforementioned risks associated with
short selling, currency risk for convertible bond portfolios
diversified across currencies and special risks that may arise
from specific clauses in the convertible bond indentures.
Fixed income markets provide plentiful profit opportunities
for hedge funds because of the difficulty of building accurate
pricing models for many fixed income instruments due to their
complex nature and the existence of multiple relative value
relationships between fixed income securities. Moreover, fixed
income markets are generally segmented because of the
distinct objectives and investment constraints of different
types of institutional players and this segmentation reveals
additional arbitrage possibilities. Hedge funds that follow fixed
income arbitrage strategies construct their portfolios by taking
corresponding long and short positions in fixed income in-
struments to exploit temporary mispricings between related
securities. Some fixed income arbitrage strategies aim to stay
market neutral and minimize their interest rate exposure by
matching their long and short positions so that the total
duration of their portfolios is close to zero. There are also fixed
income arbitrage strategies that take outright directional risks
in the fixed income markets and try to anticipate movements in
interest rates to generate returns. As such, the term “arbitrage”
may not refer to a pure arbitrage opportunity in a technical
sense, but instead refer to a long/short fixed income portfolio
that is exposed to a variety of risks. Due to the fact that the
opportunities that fixed income arbitrageurs detect are usually
short-lived and small in magnitude, these hedge funds depend
on sophisticated quantitative valuation models and use large
amounts of leverage to magnify returns.
Global macro strategies are difficult to characterize since
they have the broadest investment mandate among the hedge
fund universe. Nevertheless, there are some common features
that are exhibited by all global macro funds. First, global
macro funds are opportunistic and, as their name implies, theiroperations are global in the sense that they can invest in any
market using any type of financial instrument they desire.
Second, the investment thesis of global macro strategies are
commonly top-down and predicated on anticipating move-
ments in macroeconomic variables such as GDP, public deficit
and balance of trade and the impact of these movements on
financial markets. When there are macroeconomic pricing
imbalances, global macro funds usually set up directional
positions and their performance is dependent on the quality
and timing of their market forecasts. In this sense, most global
macro funds are considered hedge funds, not because they
engage in hedging activity, but because they can operate in a
more unrestricted way compared to traditional funds. This
directional focus has caused global macro returns to be highly
volatile historically, but over time, more global macro funds
have begun emphasizing capital preservation and return con-
sistency. Due to the nature of the strategy, funds that follow a
global macro strategy can opportunistically imitate other
strategies and can sometimes be perceived as multi-strategy
funds. In this respect, the notion of style drift is naturally
built in the global macro strategy. Global macro funds are
different than relative value funds in the sense that their in-
vestment success is hinged upon directional price movements
in various financial instruments rather than the widening or
narrowing of a valuation spread between multiple related se-
curities. Also, global macro strategies are different than equity
hedge strategies since the latter follows a bottom-up approach
by focusing on corporate fundamentals.
The growth potential of emerging markets driven by their
productivity and technological improvements has historically
spurred interest in the hedge fund industry. Emerging market
strategies are attractive because although emerging markets
own most of the human and natural resources of the world,
their security valuations are lower compared to their devel-
oped counterparts. It should also be noted that emerging
markets are volatile and traditional risk management tech-
niques such as diversification are sometimes inefficient due to
reasons such as systematic contagion, the existence of flagship
sectors in a particular market, infrequent trading, high trans-
action costs and low speed of trade execution. Funds that are
categorized as emerging market funds can follow many of the
aforementioned strategies such as equity hedge, relative value,
global macro or event driven based on their expertise and
analysis.
Managed futures funds mainly invest in futures contracts,
which are standardized agreements between two counter-
parties to buy or sell a given asset at a certain price at a certain
future date. These funds are directional in the sense that they
do not hedge their positions, but they are still grouped as
hedge funds due to their regulatory origins and fee structures.
In the early days, managed futures funds were also called
commodity trading advisors because most of the futures
contracts were written on commodities. Today, the futures
markets are dominated by non-commodity related futures
contracts such as those written on corporate securities or
currencies. Managers of managed futures funds believe that
they can identify and forecast price variations in futures in the
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macro managers. One of the differences between managed
futures funds and macro funds is that the former relies more on
a systematic approach based on computer models whereas the
latter relies more on a discretionary approach based on human
judgment. The investment horizon and the types of futures
traded can be different from one managed futures fund to
another. It is common to see a significant amount of leverage
being employed in managed futures trading.
Multi-strategy hedge funds are characterized by their flex-
ibility to invest in different hedge fund strategies depending
upon the opportunities that are available to them. Multi-
strategy funds commonly have different trading groups that
specialize on different strategies and the chief fund manager
decides on the capital to be allocated to different strategies in a
dynamic manner. In this sense, multi-strategy funds are similar
to global macro funds but they lack the top-down approach
and the directionality of the latter. Diversifying capital across
strategies has the advantage of letting the funds alter their
investment approach under circumstances where certain stra-
tegies may be unprofitable. Thus, multi-strategy managers aim
to generate positive returns regardless of the movements in the
markets and reduce the risk profile of their portfolios. A
drawback of multi-strategy hedge funds is that these funds
may not attract the best talent due to their lack of strategic
focus.
3. Data and summary statistics
Due to the fact that the hedge fund industry developed from
a niche business to a substantial alternative investment class
and the increasing institutional demand over time, hedge fund
data has become more complete and accessible in the recent
years. Accordingly, a large number of hedge fund indices
became available and started playing a more prominent role
for investors. Hedge fund indices serve a multitude of pur-
poses. They provide a broad idea about the performance and
risks of the overall hedge fund industry and specific fund
strategies. This is especially important for decisions regarding
optimal portfolio composition. Also, hedge fund indices can
act as a benchmark for individual funds and make it possible
to understand which funds have superior performance char-
acteristics compared to their peers.
Besides their benefits, hedge fund indices are also hard to
construct. First, there are several data biases pertaining to in-
dividual hedge funds which are also relevant for hedge fund
indices. Unlike mutual funds whose performance data must be
disclosed to the public, hedge funds may choose not to report
their performances. Therefore, the hedge funds that opt to be a
part of commercial databases and report their performances
may not be a random sample of the entire universe of hedge
funds and suffer from a selection bias. Another type of data
bias is the survivorship bias. This refers to the fact that some
hedge funds are excluded from performance studies because
they are no longer alive. Naturally, the historical returns re-
ported to index providers only reflect the performance of
hedge funds that have managed to stay afloat and the existenceof performance data is conditional on survival. There is also
the backfill bias which is related to the possibility that an index
provider may allow a new fund to backfill its past returns on
the date that the fund enters the database. It is likely that hedge
funds that perform well during their initial phase will be
overrepresented in the indices. Other than these three major
sources of data problems, there are also biases that pertain to
how an index provider selects the funds to be included in its
sample universe. Every database applies different screens to
individual hedge funds before it decides to use a fund’s per-
formance data and therefore, it is possible that the perfor-
mance data for a certain group of hedge funds does not get
incorporated into the databases.
Second, classifying funds into strategies is an arduous
process because the strategy of an individual fund may not be
clean cut and be subject to change over time. Many indices use
the styles that managers proclaim their funds to follow, how-
ever, this may be misleading and the indices may be using data
from funds that should actually be classified elsewhere. To be
deserving of the confidence of the investment public, the rules
regarding the selection of the funds to be included in an index,
the weighting scheme for individual fund returns and the
mechanisms through which new funds are deleted from an
index should be transparent. There is also the question of
whether a hedge fund index is investable or non-investable. It
is a widely known fact that not every hedge fund is open to
new investors because some funds do not want to dilute their
returns by accepting too much capital. If an index reflects the
performance of hedge funds that do not accept new capital and
if these closed funds tend to be the better performers, then the
index performance figures may overstate the returns that new
investors can achieve by investing in hedge funds. On the other
hand, including only investable funds in an index does not give
an accurate picture of the performance of the overall hedge
fund industry. Therefore, we will focus on both investable and
non-investable indices and clearly distinguish between them
when we report descriptive statistics and risk-adjusted per-
formance metrics.
Our hedge fund index data comes from Dow Jones Credit
Suisse database formerly known as Credit Suisse/Tremont.
This database provides asset-weighted hedge fund indices
meaning that the index performance is measured by weighting
each hedge fund’s return by the total assets that the fund has
under management. The non-investable hedge fund indices
provided by Dow Jones Credit Suisse (DJCS) include a
composite index entitled the DJCS Hedge Fund Index and 10
primary strategy categories. The strategy indices are event
driven, long/short equity hedge, equity market neutral, dedi-
cated short bias, convertible arbitrage, fixed income arbitrage,
global macro, emerging markets, managed futures and multi-
strategy. For non-investable indices, three additional sub-
strategies are also reported under the event driven strategy.
These sub-strategies are distressed restructuring, merger/risk
arbitrage and multi-strategy event driven.
The DJCS index hedge fund universe is defined as hedge
funds with a minimum of $50 million in assets under man-
agement, a minimum of one-year track record and current
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85% of the assets under management in their respective
strategy universe. The indices are calculated and rebalanced
monthly whereas the funds that constitute the indices are
reselected on a quarterly basis. By subscribing to a rules-based
constituent selection technique and disclosing the constituent
funds, DJCS aims to minimize subjectivity. DJCS tracks more
than 8000 individual hedge funds and, due to the screens
mentioned above, there are more than 900 funds in the index
universe. Non-investable DJCS indices are not only restricted
to U.S. hedge funds and funds from all over the world are
taken into account. The data for the non-investable DJCS
hedge fund indices start from January 1994. The number of
qualifying funds varies by strategy and by the quarter that the
indices are rebalanced. If a fund does not report monthly
performance or assets under management for two consecutive
months, it is considered that the fund has failed to comply with
the rules relating to the provision of financial information and
is removed from the indices.
The investable hedge fund indices provided by DJCS are
named Dow Jones Credit Suisse AllHedge Indices. These
indices are designed to provide transparent, representative and
objective benchmarks of ten style-based investment strategies
of the hedge fund universe. To be included in the DJCS All-
Hedge strategy indices, a hedge fund should be accepting new
investments and redemptions. Also, DJCS imposes some
upper bounds to the minimum amount of initial and subse-
quent investments to a hedge fund before classifying the fund
as investable. It is required that the fund is not domiciled in the
U.S. because on-shore hedge funds are typically incorporated
as limited partnerships and most limited partnerships are
closed structures meaning that no new investor can join in
after the fund has been launched. In contrast, to borrow from
the mutual fund terminology, most off-shore funds are “open
ended” and they allow investors to make new capital contri-
butions on a regular basis. To be qualified as investable, a
hedge fund should have no lock-up period and it should allow
investments and redemptions no less frequently than monthly.
There are some strategies such as convertible arbitrage, event
driven and multi-strategy that are exceptions to this rule and,
for these strategies, funds that only allow quarterly re-
demptions are also considered to be investable. Redemption
notifications are required to be given at most one month before
the redemption dates except the convertible arbitrage, event
driven and multi-strategy indices for which the notification
time limit is extended to three months. The assets under
management should be at least $100 million for investable
funds. As is the case for non-investable indices, funds must
have a current audited financial statement and a minimum one-
year track record to qualify for the investable indices. The
investable DJCS AllHedge indices are rebalanced semi-
annually and their performance data begins in October 2004.
There are some commonalities regarding how non-
investable and investable indices are constructed. For both
types of indices, the methodology is allowed to apply fund
weight caps to enhance diversification and limit concentration
risk. The performance data is reported net of all fees anddenominated in U.S. dollars. Funds of hedge funds are not
included in any of the indices. A fund can be dropped from the
indices if it does not comply with the reporting or provision of
financial information requirements. Any new funds added to
the indices contribute on a “going-forward” basis only and the
historic monthly figures will not be adjusted. This serves to
minimize the impact of the backfill bias. To minimize the
effect of the survivorship bias, DJCS indices do not remove
funds in the process of liquidation and, therefore, capture all of
the potential negative performance before a fund ceases to
operate.
The two main factors that affect investment decisions are
return and risk. Each must be taken into account for under-
standing what has happened in the past. Of course, the future
will not mimic the past; however, it is important to know about
the past to conduct educated analysis about what may happen
in the future. Although assessing risk and return seem to be
primitive at first sight, there is no agreed upon standards to
measure these two facets of investing and this problem is even
more troublesome for hedge funds. Hedge funds are subject to
less stringent disclosure requirements than other types of
managed funds. Most hedge fund managers prefer to operate
secretly to avoid their competitors from understanding their
investment strategies and trade exposures as this could prove
disastrous for them. Thus, most hedge funds are still unwilling
to provide detailed information regarding their portfolio po-
sitions and risks despite the increased interest of institutional
investors and the corresponding demand for transparency.
The return of a hedge fund is commonly measured as the
percentage change in the net value of the assets that the hedge
fund has under management. However, this is easier said than
done. If investors are allowed to invest capital in a fund at
different times during a calendar year, they would be sub-
scribing to the fund at different net asset values. Since
incentive fees are calculated as a percentage of the apprecia-
tion of the fund value, different investors would be facing
different incentive fees and this situation makes it harder to
calculate hedge fund returns that are net of fees. Hedge fund
managers may also act opportunistically with respect to the
type of prices they use to determine asset values. There is no
standard in the markets regarding how to price assets if several
quotes for a particular asset are present. Also, the valuation
methodologies and information sources can widely differ in
the process of pricing illiquid securities for which reliable
quotes are not available. All of these factors complicate the
calculation of returns for hedge fund indices.
Calculating the risks underlying investing in hedge funds is
also tricky. The most common way of measuring the risk of an
investment is related to the extent of the dispersion of his-
torical returns around their arithmetic mean, or the standard
deviation. If asset returns are normally distributed, then the
distributions can be characterized by their means and standard
deviations only. However, returns of most financial assets have
been shown to violate normality. Particularly, large swings in
asset prices occur more frequently than what normality im-
plies. This is even more pronounced for hedge fund returns
since hedge funds engage in non-linear trading strategies using
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namely skewness and kurtosis, to capture deviations from
normality. By itself, the standard deviation has several short-
comings as a measure of risk since it treats returns that exceed
the mean and the returns that fall below the mean equally from
a risk perspective. Most investors would not think of increases
in their portfolio value as risk, however, the concept of vola-
tility does not distinguish between high and low returns.
Therefore, the concept of downside risk has gained popularity
both in the academic literature and practice. Downside risk
treats returns that are lower than a benchmark as risk and
classifies returns that are higher than the benchmark as op-
portunity. We will have more to say about downside risk when
we present the risk-adjusted performances of hedge fund
indices in the next section.
Tables 1 and 2 present descriptive statistics for non-
investable hedge fund indices compiled by DJCS. Table 1
reports statistics for the full sample period beginning from
January 1994 whereas Table 2 reports statistics for a more
recent sample period which starts at October 2004. The reason
why we choose to report results for this recent sample period
is that the performance data for investable DJCS indices be-
gins only on October 2004. Analyzing this recent sample
period for non-investable indices separately allows us both to
comment on how the performance of non-investable DJCS
indices changed over time and also to compare the perfor-
mances of the non-investable and investable indices compiled
by DJCS for a common sample period.
Looking at the mean statistics in Table 1, one can clearly
see that there is quite a dispersion between the average
monthly performances of the non-investable DJCS strategy
indices. The best average performer is the global macro
strategy with an average return of 0.975% per month and the
worst average performer is the dedicated short bias strategy
with an average loss of 0.228% per month. The composite
DJSC Hedge Fund index has a mean return of 0.717%. After
global macro comes the distressed restructuring strategy index
with an average return of 0.832%. All event driven strategyTable 1
Descriptive statistics for non-investable hedge fund indices (Full sample). This tab
indices and a composite non-investable hedge fund index for the period between Jan
mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness, kurtosis as wel
Mean StDev Min 10% 25% Me
Event Driven 0.750 1.821 11.770 1.200 0.040 0
Distressed Restructuring 0.832 1.905 12.450 1.200 0.005 1
Merger/Risk Arbitrage 0.535 1.199 6.150 0.770 0.005 0
Multi-Strategy Event Driven 0.714 1.970 11.520 1.250 0.045 0
Long/Short Equity Hedge 0.769 2.862 11.430 2.310 0.860 0
Equity Market Neutral 0.453 2.965 40.450 0.520 0.110 0
Dedicated Short Bias 0.228 4.901 11.280 6.360 3.400 0
Convertible Arbitrage 0.626 1.989 12.590 1.190 0.030 0
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.456 1.643 14.040 0.660 0.195 0
Global Macro 0.975 2.788 11.550 2.000 0.180 1
Emerging Markets 0.680 4.273 23.030 4.130 1.260 1
Managed Futures 0.533 3.373 9.350 3.810 1.860 0
Multi-Strategy 0.650 1.547 7.350 1.100 0.090 0
DJSC Hedge Fund Index 0.717 2.172 7.550 1.480 0.225 0indices with the exception of merger/risk arbitrage have mean
returns that are equal to or higher than that of the composite
DJCS Hedge Fund index. Merger/risk arbitrage index lags
behind the composite index with a mean return of 0.535%. In
the equity hedge category, the long/short equity hedge index
outperforms the composite index with an average return of
0.769%, however, the equity market neutral and the dedicated
short bias indices are among the worst performers. The
convertible arbitrage and fixed income arbitrage indices that
belong to the relative value category also fare behind the
composite index with mean returns of 0.626% and 0.456%,
respectively. Emerging markets, managed futures and multi-
strategy indices also underperform the composite index with
average returns that range from 0.533% to 0.680%.
Arithmetic averages are sensitive towards outliers and, in
the presence of extreme returns, medians may provide a more
accurate picture of the central tendency of a return distribu-
tion. The first observation that jumps out of Table 1 is that,
with the exception of dedicated short bias and managed fu-
tures, all strategy indices have median returns that are greater
than or equal to their mean returns. This observation implies
that most hedge fund indices expose investors to extreme
losses and the left tails of the hedge fund return distributions
tend to be longer than the right tails. This is also evidenced by
the prominence of negative skewness statistics that the indices
exhibit. Skewness statistics vary between 2.677 and 0.025
for 11 out of 13 non-investable strategy indices indicating that
the asymmetries inherent in most hedge fund return distribu-
tions are relatively mild. The exceptions are equity market
neutral and fixed income arbitrage indices that have skewness
statistics of 11.820 and 4.439, respectively. These highly
negative values are driven by the drastic losses that these two
indices experienced during the financial crisis of 2008.
For all strategy indices, we observe that the standard de-
viation of returns is greater than the mean returns. The com-
posite DJCS Hedge Fund index has a standard deviation of
2.172%. Setting this figure as a yardstick, two groups of hedge
fund indices stick out as being more volatile than thele presents descriptive statistics for various non-investable hedge fund strategy
uary 1994 and August 2012. The descriptive statistics presented in the table are
l as the 10th, 25th, 75th and 90th percentiles of the index return distributions.
dian 75% 90% Max Skew Kurt #Obs Data interval
.995 1.875 2.540 4.220 2.215 13.444 224 199,401e201,208
.120 1.970 2.780 4.150 2.139 13.620 224 199,401e201,208
.530 1.225 1.880 3.810 0.964 7.461 224 199,401e201,208
.900 1.885 2.620 4.780 1.732 10.368 224 199,401e201,208
.780 2.325 3.740 13.010 0.011 6.130 224 199,401e201,208
.680 1.275 1.840 3.660 11.820 163.196 224 199,401e201,208
.735 2.930 6.150 22.710 0.666 4.340 224 199,401e201,208
.965 1.490 2.160 5.810 2.677 18.935 224 199,401e201,208
.740 1.165 1.620 4.330 4.439 33.740 224 199,401e201,208
.050 2.145 3.520 10.600 0.018 6.824 224 199,401e201,208
.170 2.810 5.010 16.420 0.753 8.031 224 199,401e201,208
.345 2.945 4.940 9.950 0.025 2.945 224 199,401e201,208
.800 1.630 2.260 4.280 1.687 8.791 222 199,403e201,208
.770 1.810 3.060 8.530 0.181 5.434 224 199,401e201,208
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for non-investable hedge fund indices (Recent Sample). This table presents descriptive statistics for various non-investable hedge fund
strategy indices and a composite non-investable hedge fund index for the period between October 2004 and August 2012. The descriptive statistics presented in the
table are mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness, kurtosis as well as the 10th, 25th, 75th and 90th percentiles of the index return
distributions.
Mean StDev Min 10% 25% Median 75% 90% Max Skew Kurt #Obs Data interval
Event Driven 0.536 1.975 5.750 1.880 0.260 0.850 1.800 2.800 4.220 1.090 4.430 95 200,410e201,208
Distressed Restructuring 0.520 1.802 5.660 1.700 0.100 0.950 1.710 2.250 4.150 1.307 5.168 95 200,410e201,208
Merger/Risk Arbitrage 0.382 1.096 3.490 0.920 0.150 0.400 0.970 1.650 3.220 0.508 4.671 95 200,410e201,208
Multi-Strategy Event Driven 0.561 2.204 6.170 2.210 0.410 0.890 2.010 2.900 4.780 0.949 4.252 95 200,410e201,208
Long/Short Equity Hedge 0.495 2.516 7.810 2.290 1.210 0.710 2.310 3.230 5.230 0.833 3.850 95 200,410e201,208
Equity Market Neutral 0.061 4.399 40.450 1.350 0.210 0.470 1.100 1.650 3.660 8.280 76.451 95 200,410e201,208
Dedicated Short Bias 0.441 4.643 11.280 5.910 3.520 0.890 3.000 5.680 10.310 0.219 2.619 95 200,410e201,208
Convertible Arbitrage 0.403 2.605 12.590 1.630 0.430 0.750 1.490 2.360 5.810 2.371 13.907 95 200,410e201,208
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.333 2.163 14.040 0.700 0.060 0.620 1.170 1.850 4.330 3.909 24.156 95 200,410e201,208
Global Macro 0.749 1.664 6.630 0.860 0.030 0.960 1.620 2.670 4.440 1.153 7.242 95 200,410e201,208
Emerging Markets 0.652 3.111 13.630 2.840 0.650 1.130 2.400 3.830 6.960 1.436 7.262 95 200,410e201,208
Managed Futures 0.507 3.191 5.390 4.030 2.320 0.430 3.220 4.820 6.610 0.042 1.864 95 200,410e201,208
Multi-Strategy 0.515 1.851 7.350 1.520 0.110 0.790 1.690 2.260 4.280 1.660 7.820 95 200,410e201,208
DJSC Hedge Fund Index 0.500 1.856 6.550 1.480 0.220 0.740 1.730 2.340 4.060 1.260 5.692 95 200,410e201,208
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deviations that vary between 2.862% and 4.901%. In other
words, whether a hedge fund has a net long/short exposure or
the fund claims to be equity market neutral is not enough to
push its volatility below that of the composite index. Second,
the standard deviations of the global macro, emerging markets
and managed futures indices are between 2.788% and 4.273%
which is consistent with the idea these strategies are known to
take directional bets. The event driven and relative value based
indices have lower volatilities compared to that of the com-
posite index.
The magnitudes of the extreme returns support our previous
point that most hedge fund index return distributions have long
tails on the left-hand side. With the exception of the long/short
equity hedge, dedicated short bias and managed futures
indices, the absolute values of the minimum returns are greater
than the maximum returns for all strategy indices. We can
emphasize this point by further adding that 10 out 13 strategy
indices experience at least one monthly return worse than
10% whereas only 4 out of 13 strategy indices experience at
least one monthly return better than 10%. The best single
monthly performance was 22.71% and exhibited by the
dedicated short bias index during the Long Term Capital
Management (LTCM) bankruptcy in 1998 when the fund’s bet
on the yield spread between high- and low-quality bonds
turned out to be disastrous due to the Russian government’s
decision to devalue its currency. The worst single monthly
performance was 40.45% and exhibited by the equity market
neutral index during the credit crunch in 2008. These extreme
returns are several standard deviations away from the mean
returns and it is no surprise that most hedge fund indices have
highly leptokurtic distributions. The three most leptokurtic
indices are equity market neutral, fixed income arbitrage and
convertible arbitrage. The kurtosis statistics for these three
indices are between 18.935 and 163.196.
Comparing the mean returns for non-investable DJCS
indices during the full sample period in Table 1 and the recent
sample period in Table 2 makes it clear that the hedge fundindustry had difficulties in generating returns as high as it used
to. For all strategy indices, the recent sample period exhibits
lower mean and median returns compared to those in the full
sample. The only exception to this pattern is the managed
futures index which has a greater median return during the
recent sample period. For the composite DJCS Hedge Fund
index, the mean monthly return drops to 0.50% from 0.72%
and the median monthly return drops to 0.74% from 0.77%.
The finding that the central tendency statistics for hedge fund
indices were pulled downwards may be due to both the
adverse impact of the global financial crisis in 2008 and the
increased difficulty in identifying and exploiting profitable
arbitrage opportunities as the hedge fund industry accumulated
more assets under management over time. In terms of the
mean returns, the global macro and emerging market indices
are the best performers during the recent sample period with
average returns of 0.749% and 0.652%, respectively. The
event driven strategies also continue to be among the better
performing strategies during the recent sample period with the
exception of merger/risk arbitrage. The worst average per-
formers are the dedicated short bias and long/short equity
hedge indices with average returns of 0.441% and 0.061%,
respectively.
The median returns tend to be higher than the mean returns
and the skewness statistics tend to be negative during the
recent sample period indicating the continued presence of long
left-tails and negative skewness in hedge fund return distri-
butions. 12 out of 13 strategy indices exhibit negative skew-
ness and the most negatively skewed strategy index is equity
market neutral with a skewness statistic of 8.280. In contrast
to all other indices, the dedicated short bias strategy index has
positive skewness in the recent sample period. Emerging
markets, global macro and distressed restructuring indices are
still the top three performers in terms of median returns
whereas dedicated short bias, merger/risk arbitrage and
managed futures strategies still have the lowest median
returns. Kurtosis statistics encountered during the recent
sample period are all lower than those for the full sample,
Fig. 1. Historical performance of non-investable DJCS hedge fund and multi-strategy indices.
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three most leptokurtic indices are still equity market neutral,
fixed income arbitrage and convertible arbitrage. Although the
average and median performances of these indices fell during
the recent period, there is no corresponding uniform drop in
the volatilities. 6 out of 13 strategy indices exhibit higher
standard deviations in the latter sample period.
Figs. 1e5 show how the monthly returns of the non-
investable DJCS indices evolved over time. One thing that is
common to all figures is the lack of smoothness. The perfor-
mance graphs cross over the horizontal axis repeatedly indi-
cating that positive returns are commonly followed by
negative returns and vice versa. Second, we observe that thereFig. 2. Historical performance of non-investable DJCS event driven, distressedare two major time periods where most hedge fund indices
were badly hit. The first one corresponds to the Russian debt
crisis in 1998 and the second one corresponds to the global
financial crisis in 2008 triggered by problems in the subprime
loan markets. The composite DJCS Hedge Fund index expe-
rienced monthly returns lower than 5% during these two
crisis periods. The event driven indices in Fig. 2 reacted more
adversely to the LTCM meltdown whereas the equity hedge
indices in Fig. 3 reacted more adversely to the recent credit
crunch. In fact, the dedicated short bias strategy was able to
produce positive returns in both periods of market turmoil due
to the nature of its trading strategy. Relative value strategies in
Fig. 4 were more sensitive towards the 2008 crisis andrestructuring, multi-strategy event driven and merger/risk arbitrage indices.
Fig. 3. Historical performance of non-investable DJCS long/short equity hedge, equity market neutral and dedicated short bias indices.
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for the global macro, managed futures and emerging markets
indices in Fig. 5. Due to the Russian debt crisis in 1998, the
emerging markets index experienced a monthly loss about
23%. Fig. 5 also shows that the upward and downward
swings of the emerging markets index was more pronounced
compared to the global macro and managed futures indices.
The fact that the hedge fund indices generated highly
negative returns during the two major market crashes is
troublesome in terms of portfolio diversification. It may be the
case that hedge funds are focused on absolute returns and theirFig. 4. Historical performance of non-investable DJCS conperformances are, on average, weakly correlated with those of
traditional asset classes. However, Figs. 1e5 show that almost
all hedge fund indices become strongly correlated with each
other and traditional market indices during market downturns.
These are exactly the instances during which investing in
hedge funds should payoff in terms of diversification, however,
the figures suggest that hedge fund indices do not fulfill their
insurance roles when they are most needed.
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for ten investable
strategy indices and the investable DJCS AllHedge composite
index. Since investable indices only consider those hedgevertible arbitrage and fixed income arbitrage indices.
Fig. 5. Historical performance of non-investable DJCS global macro, managed futures and emerging markets indices.
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capital from, they are more likely to represent the actual
returns that a new investor can realize by investing in hedge
funds. The most important observation from Table 3 is that the
mean returns for investable indices are lower than those for the
non-investable indices in Table 2. For example, the non-
investable DJCS Hedge Fund index has an average return of
0.50% in the recent sample period whereas the investable
DJCS AllHedge index has an average return of only 0.23%.
The only exception to this pattern is the dedicated short bias
strategy. This finding is not unexpected because many well-
performing hedge funds are closed to new capital contribu-
tions so that their returns are not diluted and funds that have
lock-up and redemption restrictions may have performance
advantages in terms of being able to include more illiquid
assets in their portfolios.
There are no drastic differences between the rankings
among non-investable indices and investable indices. The only
major change that sticks out is that the global macro and
managed futures strategies trade places. The managed futuresTable 3
Descriptive Statistics for investable hedge fund indices (Recent Sample). This table
and a composite investable hedge fund index for the period between October 200
median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness, kurtosis as well as th
Mean StDev Min 10% 25% Me
Event Driven 0.349 2.342 8.210 2.230 1.100 0
Long/Short Equity Hedge 0.252 2.661 10.470 3.260 1.240 1
Equity Market Neutral 0.142 2.939 17.890 1.900 0.800 0
Dedicated Short Bias 0.391 4.715 15.940 5.210 3.360 0
Convertible Arbitrage 0.197 3.510 20.180 1.900 0.480 0
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.197 2.969 20.420 1.220 0.350 0
Global Macro 0.177 2.639 13.780 2.570 0.530 0
Emerging Markets 0.420 4.187 20.650 5.060 1.270 1
Managed Futures 0.497 2.929 5.970 3.350 1.980 0
Multi-Strategy 0.234 2.300 13.430 1.560 0.290 0
DJCS AllHedge Index 0.230 2.119 10.450 1.810 0.630 0index which has the seventh highest mean return among the
non-investable indices is the top performer among the
investable indices with an average monthly return of 0.497%.
The global macro index which is the top performer among the
non-investable indices has only the seventh highest mean re-
turn among the investable indices with an average monthly
return of 0.177%. After the managed futures strategy, the
emerging markets and event driven strategies have the highest
mean returns. The worst performers also stay the same. The
dedicated short bias, fixed income arbitrage and equity market
neutral strategies produce the worst results with average
returns that are between 0.391% and 0.142%.
The median returns of all investable indices are greater than
the mean returns with the exception of the dedicated short bias
index. This finding highlights the fact that investable hedge
fund indices also have long left-tails. Consequently, all strat-
egy indices except the dedicated short bias index have negative
skewness statistics that range from 3.825 to 0.076. The
DJCS AllHedge index is also negatively skewed with a
skewness statistic of 2.172. The standard deviations of allpresents descriptive statistics for various investable hedge fund strategy indices
4 and August 2012. The descriptive statistics presented in the table are mean,
e 10th, 25th, 75th and 90th percentiles of the index return distributions.
dian 75% 90% Max Skew Kurt #Obs Data interval
.640 1.850 2.880 5.590 0.788 4.555 95 200,410e201,208
.010 2.020 2.820 4.440 1.447 6.102 95 200,410e201,208
.210 0.720 1.610 9.240 2.788 19.276 95 200,410e201,208
.750 2.950 5.610 12.100 0.003 3.706 95 200,410e201,208
.640 1.420 2.490 6.460 3.544 21.025 95 200,410e201,208
.290 0.860 1.230 10.050 3.825 27.745 95 200,410e201,208
.330 1.650 2.380 7.790 1.766 11.805 95 200,410e201,208
.190 2.710 5.070 7.790 1.631 8.744 95 200,410e201,208
.570 2.830 4.480 7.190 0.076 2.173 95 200,410e201,208
.560 1.340 1.900 7.350 2.688 17.410 95 200,410e201,208
.750 1.600 2.170 3.390 2.172 10.842 95 200,410e201,208
Fig. 6. Historical performance of investable DJCS AllHedge and multi-strategy indices.
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Moreover, the volatility of the investable indices for 8 out 10
strategies is higher than the volatility of the corresponding
non-investable indices, with the exception of the equity market
neutral and managed futures strategies. Consistent with the
prominence of long left-tails in the return distributions, the
absolute value of the minimum index return is greater than the
maximum return for all investable indices except managed
futures. The minimum monthly returns are quite substantial
and convertible arbitrage, fixed arbitrage and emerging mar-
kets are three strategy indices that experienced a monthly re-
turn lower than 20%. In contrast, there are only two strategy
indices that experienced a monthly return greater than 10%.
We also see that the minimum returns of investable indices are
even lower than those of the non-investable indices, with the
exception of the equity market neutral strategy. This finding
indicates that the investable hedge funds were even moreFig. 7. Historical performance of investable DJCS long/short equityharshly beaten by the 2008 crisis compared to their non-
investable counterparts. The extreme returns of all investable
hedge fund indices lie far away from their means indicating
the presence of fat tails. The large kurtosis statistics confirm
this conjecture. The fixed income arbitrage and convertible
arbitrage strategies lead the bunch with kurtosis statistics of
27.745 and 21.025, respectively. The composite investable
hedge fund index is also highly leptokurtic with a kurtosis
statistic of 10.842.
Figs. 6e9 show how the monthly returns of the investable
DJCS indices evolved over time. There are two general con-
clusions we can draw from these figures. First, all the invest-
able hedge fund indices reacted negatively in the face of the
2008 financial crisis. The minimum monthly returns of all
investable hedge fund indices belong to this period and these
minimum returns vary between 10% and 20%. As
explained before, this observation has negative implicationshedge, equity market neutral and dedicated short bias indices.
Fig. 8. Historical performance of investable DJCS convertible arbitrage, fixed income arbitrage and event driven indices.
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funds. The only strategy that managed to escape the credit
crunch was managed futures. In October 2010, a month which
turned out to be exceptionally dismal for all investable indices,
the managed futures index posted a monthly return of 7.19%.
Second, for all investable indices, about one-third of the
months during the recent sample exhibit negative returns. This
proportion is even higher for the dedicated short bias strategy,
which posted negative monthly returns during more than half
of the sample period. The implication is that, although hedge
funds are absolute return oriented by nature, they are not able
to generate such absolute returns consistently.Fig. 9. Historical performance of investable DJCS global m4. Risk-adjusted performance metrics of hedge fund
indices
The risks associated with the dynamic trading strategies
adopted by hedge funds are manifold. First, there is the market
risk or systematic risk which is the risk associated with the
movements in variables such as security prices, interest rates
and exchange rates that affect broad capital markets. A special
feature of the hedge fund industry is that it is allowed to make
heavy use of leverage and this practice has the potential to
magnify market risks. Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2012) find
that systematic risk is a highly significant factor explaining theacro, managed futures and emerging markets indices.
Table 4
Sharpe ratios for non-investable hedge fund indices. This table presents Sharpe
ratios for various non-investable hedge fund strategy indices and a composite
non-investable hedge fund index. For each hedge fund index, we calculate
monthly Sharpe ratios as the ratio of the monthly index return to the standard
deviation of the index returns over the last 36 months. The table reports the
average of these Sharpe ratios. The full sample is from January 1997 to August
2012 and the recent sample is from October 2007 to August 2012.
Full sample Recent sample
Event Driven 0.44795 0.23859
Distressed Restructuring 0.47057 0.21381
Merger/Risk Arbitrage 0.28929 0.31081
Multi-Strategy Event Driven 0.38173 0.24519
Long/Short Equity Hedge 0.25390 0.15427
Equity Market Neutral 0.59795 0.16415
Dedicated Short Bias 0.08716 0.06529
Convertible Arbitrage 0.34980 0.10638
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.28265 0.04721
Global Macro 0.45858 0.38262
Emerging Markets 0.21036 0.17198
Managed Futures 0.09826 0.15690
Multi-Strategy 0.42675 0.18235
DJCS Hedge Fund Index 0.32384 0.19946
S&P 500 0.09334 0.02468
45Y. Atilgan et al. / Borsa I_stanbul Review 13 (2013) 30e52dispersion of cross-sectional returns whereas measures of re-
sidual risk have little explanatory power. Second, there are the
credit risks faced by a hedge fund. These risks are related to
the operational structure and organizational processes of a
hedge fund or its counterparties. Third, there are the liquidity
risks which may originate from two sources. First, although
many hedge fund investors are subject to lock up and similar
restrictions, their redemption requests could cause liquidity
problems for a hedge fund. Second, many hedge funds carry
highly illiquid assets in their holdings which may cause an
extra risk in relation to the values of their overall portfolios.
These three major sources of risk impact different hedge fund
indices in different ways. Long/short equity hedge funds areTable 5
Sharpe ratios for investable hedge fund indices. This table presents
Sharpe ratios for various investable hedge fund strategy indices and
a composite investable hedge fund index. For each hedge fund
index, we calculate monthly Sharpe ratios as the ratio of the
monthly index return to the standard deviation of the index returns
over the last 36 months. The table reports the average of these
Sharpe ratios. The recent sample is from October 2007 to August
2012.
Recent sample
Event Driven 0.15085
Long/Short Equity Hedge 0.00880
Equity Market Neutral 0.08357
Dedicated Short Bias 0.07991
Convertible Arbitrage 0.00319
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.14612
Global Macro 0.04011
Emerging Markets 0.05673
Managed Futures 0.17919
Multi-Strategy 0.02270
DJCS AllHedge Index 0.04940
S&P 500 0.02942exposed to short squeeze risks, merger/risk arbitrage funds are
subject to event risk, distressed restructuring funds are subject
to credit and liquidity risks, emerging market funds are subject
to sovereign risk, and so on.
Many hedge funds advertise themselves on the strength of
their historical returns. A fund that generates higher returns
than the average fund in its peer group prides in itself for
beating the competition. However, returns constitute only one
dimension of performance. Although risk is equally important
as returns, most funds do not spend enough effort to document
how much risk they have undertaken in order to generate the
returns they did. Can we clearly say that a fund with higher
risk that generates a higher return performs better than a fund
with lower risk that generates a lower return? The answer to
this question is ambiguous because what really matters is the
ability of a hedge fund to generate higher returns per unit risk.
Therefore, in this section, we calculate the risk-adjusted per-
formances of various hedge fund strategies and compare them
to each other. It should be noted that there are many different
possible risk measures and it is possible that hedge fund
indices may rank differently based on which metric is used.
Also, there is no conceptual cohesion between different risk
measures. Our goals are to comment on various risk-adjusted
performance measures, provide the logic behind each mea-
sure and highlight their strengths and weaknesses.4.1. Sharpe ratioThe Sharpe ratio is one of the most popular reward-to-risk
ratios in both the academia and the industry. It is equal to the
return of a hedge fund above the risk-free rate scaled by the
fund’s return volatility as measured by standard deviation. We
calculate a Sharpe ratio for each hedge fund index i for each
month t using the following formula:
Sharpe Ratioi;t ¼ Ri;t Rf ;t
st
ð1Þ
where Ri;t denotes the average return of the hedge fund index i
during the last 36 months and Rf ;t denotes the risk-free rate at
the end of month t. We calculate the standard deviation in the
denominator, st, as the standard deviation of the monthly
index returns over the past 36 months. A greater Sharpe ratio
implies that the hedge fund index has generated a higher
excess return per unit of volatility. An advantage of the Sharpe
ratio is that it is not affected by the leverage that a hedge fund
undertakes.
Tables 4 and 5 present the Sharpe ratios for the DJCS non-
investable and investable indices, respectively. To calculate the
Sharpe ratios, we need 36 months of historical data; therefore,
the monthly series for the Sharpe ratios for each index begins
exactly 36 months after the return series. We again report full
sample and recent sample results for the non-investable
indices in order to both observe the historical change in the
Sharpe ratios and compare investable and non-investable
indices during a common time window. The recent sample is
also interesting due to the fact that it corresponds to the post-
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convention also applies to all the risk-adjusted performance
metrics that we will introduce later.
We calculate a Sharpe ratio for each month and hedge fund
index following equation (1). The tables report the arithmetic
averages of these monthly Sharpe ratios. Most empirical
studies calculate a single Sharpe ratio for the sample periods
under consideration; however, doing so assumes that the risk-
to-reward ratio for an index is constant over time. In reality,
the Sharpe ratios are time-varying and we aim to capture this
time variation by adopting a methodology that constructs the
ratios in a rolling window fashion.
In Table 4, we see that the highest Sharpe ratio is 0.598 and
it belongs to the equity market neutral index. The interpreta-
tion of this number is that the equity market neutral index
generates almost 60 basis points of excess returns per unit of
standard deviation, on average. This is worth scrutiny because
the equity market neutral index has the second to last mean
return in Table 1. However, it also has a lower than average
standard deviation and with this risk-adjustment, the index
experiences a drastic improvement in its comparative perfor-
mance. This finding alone is sufficient to conclude that
adjusting for risk is essential to obtain a meaningful compar-
ison of index performance. After the equity market neutral
index, the indices with the highest volatility-adjusted returns
are the distressed restructuring, global macro and event driven
indices with Sharpe ratios between 0.471 and 0.448. These
three indices are also among the top four based on their mean
returns. Ignoring the equity market neutral index, the other
two equity hedge indices have weak volatility-adjusted per-
formances. It is not a surprise that the dedicated short bias
strategy ranks at the bottom with its Sharpe ratio of 0.087
because this index also had the lowest mean return. However,
the long/short equity hedge index which is in the top three
based on mean returns ranks only the tenth based on Sharpe
ratios. This finding again attests to the importance of adjusting
for risk. The other two indices that have the lowest Sharpe
ratios are the emerging markets and managed futures indices.
These strategies rank somewhere in the middle for average
returns, but they have the highest standard deviations after the
dedicated short bias strategy. Consequently, their relatively
high volatilities push the two strategies to the bottom of the
rankings based on Sharpe ratios. The two indices under the
relative value category, namely convertible arbitrage and fixed
income arbitrage, are poor to mediocre performers based on
their mean returns and they continue to be so based on their
Sharpe ratios.
The composite DJCS Hedge Fund index would have ranked
eighth among the strategy indices with its Sharpe ratio of
0.324. We also report volatility-adjusted performances for the
S&P 500 index in order to see whether hedge funds can pro-
vide superior returns compared to a traditional equity index
through their absolute return focus. We find that this is indeed
the case. The S&P 500 index has a Sharpe ratio of 0.093
during the full sample period. This figure corresponds to less
than a third of the Sharpe ratio of the DJCS Hedge Fund index.
Moreover, the S&P 500 index can only beat the dedicatedshort bias strategy and provides an inferior volatility-adjusted
performance compared to all other hedge fund indices.
In the recent sample, we observe that only three indices
increase their volatility-adjusted performances. These indices
belong to the merger/risk arbitrage, managed futures and
dedicated short bias strategies. The magnitudes of these in-
creases are small. For the other hedge fund indices, we observe
substantial drops in the Sharpe ratios. The equity market
neutral index experiences a particularly sharp decrease in its
Sharpe ratio from 0.598 to 0.164. As a result, it is no longer
the top performing hedge fund strategy and slips down to the
eighth rank. This observation is not surprising because, in
Table 2, the equity market neutral has the second lowest mean
return and the second highest standard deviation. The other
two indices in the equity hedge category also continue to be
weak volatility-adjusted performers. The highest Sharpe ratio
in the recent sample period belongs to the global macro index
and is equal to 0.383. The global macro index has the highest
mean return and the second lowest standard deviation in Table
2. The other category that has a strong volatility-adjusted
performance is the event driven category. The four indices in
this category follow the global macro index with Sharpe ratios
varying between 0.214 and 0.311. The index that deserves the
most attention in this group is the merger/risk arbitrage index.
Despite its low average return, the merger/risk arbitrage index
has the lowest standard deviation in Table 2 and this low
volatility pays off by granting the index the second highest
Sharpe ratio in the recent period after the global macro strat-
egy. The convertible arbitrage and fixed-income arbitrage
indices have Sharpe ratios of 0.106 and 0.047, respectively,
and they are the worst volatility-adjusted performers after the
dedication short bias strategy. Emerging markets and managed
futures indices surpass these two relative value indices in the
recent period but their respective Sharpe ratios of 0.172 and
0.157 still place them in the bottom half of the rankings. DJCS
Hedge Fund index also experiences a drop in its Sharpe ratio
from 0.324 to 0.199 and it would rank the sixth among the
strategy indices. S&P 500 index has a negative average Sharpe
ratio in the recent sample period and is only able to beat the
dedicated short bias index.
Table 5 presents the Sharpe ratios of the investable DJCS
hedge fund indices. First, the Sharpe ratios of all strategies,
except that of managed futures, are lower for the investable
indices compared to their non-investable counterparts. We
already observed that investable indices had lower mean
returns compared to non-investable indices in Table 3 and
now, we find that this also translates to the volatility-adjusted
performances. The highest Sharpe ratio belongs to the
managed futures strategy and is equal to 0.179. Considering
that the non-investable managed futures index was a weak
performer, we can conclude that the investable managed fu-
tures funds are much better performers with respect to the non-
investable managed futures funds. The event driven index is
also strong with its Sharpe ratio of 0.151. Two directional
strategies, emerging markets and global macro come next with
their Sharpe ratios of 0.057 and 0.040. It is worthwhile
emphasizing once more that these figures are much lower than
Table 6
Sortino ratios for non-investable hedge fund indices. This table presents
Sortino ratios for various non-investable hedge fund strategy indices and a
composite non-investable hedge fund index. For each hedge fund index, we
calculate monthly Sortino ratios as the ratio of the monthly index return to the
semi-deviation of the index returns over the last 36 months. The table reports
the average of these Sortino ratios. The full sample is from January 1997 to
August 2012 and the recent sample is from October 2007 to August 2012.
Full sample Recent sample
Event Driven 0.45592 0.18636
Distressed Restructuring 0.61399 0.19638
Merger/Risk Arbitrage 0.27199 0.32580
Multi-Strategy Event Driven 0.37443 0.18606
Long/Short Equity Hedge 0.25603 0.14426
Equity Market Neutral 1.19577 0.22477
Dedicated Short Bias 0.08598 0.05885
Convertible Arbitrage 0.22577 0.09876
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.21939 0.08252
Global Macro 0.61670 0.41221
Emerging Markets 0.18704 0.14711
Managed Futures 0.10853 0.17392
Multi-Strategy 0.46079 0.17899
DJCS Hedge Fund Index 0.36524 0.18567
S&P 500 0.08479 0.01094
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strategies. The indices under the equity hedge category rank at
the bottom half and two of these indices, namely equity
market neutral and dedicated short bias have negative average
Sharpe ratios. The convertible arbitrage and fixed income
arbitrage indices also have negative Sharpe ratios. The
convertible arbitrage index has a positive mean return in Table
3, therefore, its negative Sharpe ratio indicates that the positive
returns occurred in periods of comparatively higher volatility.
The Sharpe ratio for the investable DJCS AllHedge index is
equal to 0.049 and is about a quarter of the Sharpe ratio of the
non-investable DJCS Hedge Fund index during the recent
sample period. Nevertheless, DJCS AllHedge index would
have ranked the fourth among the investable strategy indices.Table 7
Sortino ratios for investable hedge fund indices. This table presents
Sortino ratios for various investable hedge fund strategy indices and
a composite investable hedge fund index. For each hedge fund
index, we calculate monthly Sortino ratios as the ratio of the
monthly index return to the semi-deviation of the index returns over
the last 36 months. The table reports the average of these Sortino
ratios. The recent sample is from October 2007 to August 2012.
Recent sample
Event Driven 0.13602
Long/Short Equity Hedge 0.01494
Equity Market Neutral 0.04663
Dedicated Short Bias 0.07547
Convertible Arbitrage 0.03483
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.08666
Global Macro 0.05089
Emerging Markets 0.05871
Managed Futures 0.19513
Multi-Strategy 0.05458
DJCS All Hedge Index 0.05681
S&P 500 0.01512Finally, the S&P 500 index has a negative average Sharpe ratio
of 0.029 in the recent sample period and lags behind 7 out of
10 strategy indices.4.2. Sortino ratioAs explained earlier, the standard deviation is an incom-
plete measure of risk because it ignores the non-normality of
hedge fund returns and does not discriminate between favor-
able and unfavorable returns. We have seen that most hedge
fund index distributions are negatively skewed and highly
leptokurtic. Moreover, these extreme index returns are gener-
ally more pronounced for the left-tail of the return distribu-
tions. Fung and Hsieh (2001) focus on trend-following hedge
fund strategies and Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) investigate
risk arbitrageurs to find that non-linear option-like payoffs are
an integral feature of the payoffs of hedge fund strategies.
Agarwal and Naik (2004) extend the hedge fund universe used
in these two studies and argue that a large number of equity-
oriented hedge fund strategies exhibit payoffs resembling a
short position on a put option on the market index and also
bear significant left-tail risk. Therefore, ignoring the tail risk
of hedge funds can result in significantly higher losses during
large market downturns. To take this type of tail risk into
account, we turn to the concept of downside risk. A couple of
studies confirm the importance of downside risk in hedge fund
performance assessment. Bali, Gokcan, and Liang (2007)
conduct portfolio and regression analysis to find that there is
a significantly positive relation between downside risk and the
cross-section of expected returns on hedge funds even after
controlling for factors such as fund size and liquidity. Bali,
Brown, and Demirtas (2013) indicate that hedge funds’
extensive use of derivatives, short-selling, and leverage and
their dynamic trading strategies create significant non-
normalities in their return distributions. Hence, the tradi-
tional performance measures fail to provide an accurate
characterization of the relative strength of hedge fund port-
folios and the authors use alternative performance measures to
determine which hedge fund strategies outperform the U.S.
equity and/or bond markets.
The first ratio that we use to reflect downside risk is the
Sortino ratio. The idea behind the Sortino ratio is that a sig-
nificant component of risk is not volatility, but rather downside
risk. The Sortino ratio is similar to the Sharpe ratio but re-
places the risk-free rate in the Sharpe ratio with a possibly
different minimum acceptable rate of return. More impor-
tantly, the volatility in the denominator is replaced by the
semi-deviation of the return distribution around the specified
minimum acceptable rate of return. For our analysis, we use
the monthly risk-free rate in the U.S. as the benchmark. We
calculate a semi-deviation for each hedge fund index i for each
month t using the following formula:
Semi deviationi;t ¼ 1
36
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃXt1
t¼t36
d2i;t
vuut ð2Þ
Table 8
Return to VaR ratios for non-investable hedge fund indices. This table presents
Return to VaR ratios for various non-investable hedge fund strategy indices
and a composite non-investable hedge fund index. For each hedge fund index,
we calculate monthly Return to VaR ratios as the ratio of the monthly index
return to the value-at-risk which is defined as the first percentile of Hansen’s
(1994) skewed t-density estimated using the index returns over the past 36
months. The table reports the average of these Return to VaR ratios. The full
sample is from January 1997 to August 2012 and the recent sample is from
October 2007 to August 2012.
Full sample Recent sample
Event Driven 0.28620 0.10400
Distressed Restructuring 0.51068 0.10322
Merger/Risk Arbitrage 0.14241 0.17665
Multi-Strategy Event Driven 0.22218 0.10016
Long/Short Equity Hedge 0.12753 0.06980
Equity Market Neutral 0.83757 0.26652
Dedicated Short Bias 0.04454 0.02682
Convertible Arbitrage 0.24269 0.05223
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.19657 0.05592
Global Macro 0.37558 0.23688
Emerging Markets 0.09745 0.07002
Managed Futures 0.05049 0.08330
Multi-Strategy 0.25897 0.09375
DJCS Hedge Fund Index 0.18615 0.09692
S&P 500 0.04558 0.00258
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di;t ¼

Ri;tRf ;t if Ri;t < Rf ;t
0 if Ri;t > Rf ;t
Using these semi-deviations, we calculate a Sortino ratio
for each hedge fund index i for each month t:
Sortino Ratioi;t ¼ Ri;t Rf ;t
Semi deviationt ð3Þ
where Ri;t denotes the average return of the hedge fund index i
during the last 36 months and Rf ;t denotes the risk-free rate at
the end of month t. A greater Sortino ratio implies that the
hedge fund index has generated a higher excess return per unit
of downside risk. Since we calculate monthly Sortino ratios for
each index, the following tables report the time-series arith-
metic averages of these Sortino ratios. Again, this methodol-
ogy has the advantage of allowing for time-variation in the
downside risk-adjusted performances of hedge fund indices.
We begin our discussion with the Sortino ratios for the non-
investable DJCS hedge fund indices in Table 6. The full
sample results indicate that, similar to the Sharpe ratios in
Table 4, the equity market neutral index has the highest Sor-
tino ratio which is equal to 1.196. In other words, this index
has generated an excess return of about 1.2% per unit of semi-
deviation. This finding deserves special attention because the
equity market neutral index is the most negatively skewed and
leptokurtic index in Table 1. Downside risk is a function of the
higher order moments of a return distribution (see Cornish and
Fisher (1937)), however, the extreme returns experienced by
the equity market neutral index does not drag its average
Sortino ratio down. This finding also has to do with the fact
that we calculate monthly Sortino ratios in a rolling window
fashion. Although the negative extreme returns of the equity
market neutral index during the recent credit crunch decrease
the monthly Sortino ratios during the crisis period, the average
Sortino ratio is still high due to the low volatility of the index
outside this period.
After the equity market neutral index, the global macro
index and the hedge fund indices in the event driven category
stand out with their high Sortino ratios. The global macro
index has a Sortino ratio of 0.617 and four indices in the event
driven category have Sortino ratios between 0.272 and 0.614.
With the exception of the merger/risk arbitrage index, all of
these strategies outperform the DJCS Hedge Fund index which
has a Sortino ratio of 0.365. The long/short equity hedge and
dedicated short bias indices have low Sortino ratios with the
latter being the worst downside risk-adjusted performer with a
Sortino ratio of 0.086. The managed futures and emerging
markets indices follow the dedicated short bias index with
Sortino ratios of 0.109 and 0.187. The fixed income arbitrage
and convertible arbitrage indices in the relative value category
are also in the bottom half of the rankings with Sortino ratios
of 0.219 and 0.226, respectively. The S&P 500 index has a
semi-deviation adjusted performance of 0.085 which is about a
quarter of that of the DJCS Hedge Fund index and lower than
those of all hedge fund indices except dedicated short bias.In the recent sample, three indices, namely the merger/risk
arbitrage, dedicated short bias and managed futures indices
have higher Sortino ratios compared to those in the full sam-
ple; however, most of the indices experience substantial drops
in their downside risk-adjusted performances. Although the
equity market neutral index still ranks in the top three, its
Sortino ratio decreases substantially to 0.225. The global
macro index leads the bunch with a Sortino ratio of 0.412 and
the merger/risk arbitrage index joins the top three with a
Sortino ratio of 0.326. The other indices in the event driven
category are also among the top half with their Sortino ratios
clustered in a narrow band between 0.186 and 0.196. The
dedicated short bias strategy is again the worst performer with
a Sortino ratio of 0.056 and the convertible arbitrage and
fixed income arbitrage indices also perform weakly. These two
indices in the relative value category have low mean returns
and average volatilities in Table 2 and their negatively skewed
and highly leptokurtic return distributions do not help for their
downside risk-adjusted performances. The managed futures
index experiences an improvement in its Sortino ratio during
the recent sample but it belongs to the bottom half of the
rankings along with the emerging markets index. DJCS Hedge
Fund index would rank seventh among the strategy indices
with its Sortino ratio of 0.186. The S&P 500 index has a
negative Sharpe ratio in Table 4 and it has a negative Sortino
ratio of 0.011 here which is only greater than that of the
dedicated short bias strategy.
Table 7 presents Sortino ratios for investable DJCS indices.
All investable indices have lower Sortino ratios compared to
their non-investable counterparts in Table 6. The exception is
the managed futures index which also has the highest Sortino
ratio of 0.195. Next is the event driven index with its Sortino
Table 9
Return to VaR ratios for investable hedge fund indices. This table
presents Return to VaR ratios for various investable hedge fund
strategy indices and a composite investable hedge fund index. For
each hedge fund index, we calculate monthly Return to VaR ratios
as the ratio of the monthly index return to the value-at-risk which is
defined as the first percentile of Hansen’s (1994) skewed t-density
estimated using the index returns over the past 36 months. The table
reports the average of these Return to VaR ratios. The recent sample
is from October 2007 to August 2012.
Recent sample
Event Driven 0.06864
Long/Short Equity Hedge 0.01154
Equity Market Neutral 0.00216
Dedicated Short Bias 0.03028
Convertible Arbitrage 0.02580
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.03307
Global Macro 0.02363
Emerging Markets 0.03512
Managed Futures 0.09586
Multi-Strategy 0.07049
DJCS All Hedge Index 0.03399
S&P 500 0.00488
Table 10
Calmar ratios for non-investable hedge fund indices. This table presents
Calmar ratios for various non-investable hedge fund strategy indices and a
composite non-investable hedge fund index. For each hedge fund index, we
calculate monthly Calmar ratios as the ratio of the monthly index return to the
maximum drawdown which is defined as the percentage difference between
the highest and the lowest values of an index during the last 36 months. The
table reports the average of these Calmar ratios. The full sample is from
January 1997 to August 2012 and the recent sample is from October 2007 to
August 2012.
Full sample Recent sample
Event Driven 0.33255 0.20054
Distressed Restructuring 0.32469 0.14199
Merger/Risk Arbitrage 0.33590 0.30523
Multi-Strategy Event Driven 0.33435 0.23591
Long/Short Equity Hedge 0.29302 0.15849
Equity Market Neutral 0.26303 0.07608
Dedicated Short Bias 0.08052 0.06350
Convertible Arbitrage 0.28595 0.11121
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.25120 0.05660
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and global macro also have comparatively strong downside
risk-adjusted performances with Sortino ratios of 0.059 and
0.051. The equity hedge and the relative value categories yield
poorly performing indices. The long/short equity hedge and
dedicated short bias indices have negative Sortino ratios. In
other words, the investable equity hedge funds have performed
worse than their non-investable counterparts in terms of
downside risk-adjusted returns. A similar picture can be
observed for the convertible arbitrage and fixed income arbi-
trage indices with the latter being at the bottom of the rankings
with a Sortino ratio of 0.087. The investable DJCS All
Hedge Fund index would have ranked fourth among the
strategy indices with its Sortino ratio of 0.057 whereas the
S&P 500 index can only beat the fixed income arbitrage,
dedicated short bias and equity market neutral indices. In other
words, despite their weak performances compared to non-
investable indices, some investable indices are able to
outperform a traditional equity market benchmark in the
recent period.
At this point, we can step back and reevaluate our discus-
sion of the Sortino ratios for non-investable and investable
DJCS hedge fund indices. When we discussed the Sharpe ratio
results earlier, we observed that telling a story solely based on
mean returns is misleading. A hedge fund index with a high
average return could turn out to be a mediocre volatility-
adjusted performer and a hedge fund index with a low
average return could turn out to be a strong volatility-adjusted
performer. This sub-section is hinged on the idea that volatility
may not be an adequate risk measure and adjusting returns
with measures of downside risk has the potential to present a
different picture. However, we observe that there are no sub-
stantial differences between the Sharpe ratio rankings in
Tables 4 and 5 and the Sortino ratio rankings in Tables 6 and 7.
One important difference is that the non-investable equity
market neutral index which ranks eighth based on its Sharpe
ratio in the full sample now ranks first based on its Sortino
ratio, but all other hedge fund indices move at most one or two
spots up or down. In other words, controlling for semi-
deviation around the risk-free rate rather than standard devi-
ation around the mean return does not cause a monumental
shift in the risk-adjusted performance rankings of hedge fund
indices despite the fact that many indices exhibit significant
negative skewness and leptokurtosis. Our finding parallels that
of Eling and Schuhmacher (2007) who find that, despite sig-
nificant deviations of hedge fund returns from a normal dis-
tribution, the comparison of the Sharpe ratio to the other
performance measures results in virtually identical rank
ordering across hedge funds between 1985 and 2004. In our
analysis, we focus on indices rather than individual hedge
funds and we extend the sample period, however, our results
are consistent with those of Eling and Schuhmacher (2007).Global Macro 0.36193 0.32520
Emerging Markets 0.22039 0.15324
Managed Futures 0.25558 0.276364.3. Return to VaR ratio
Multi-Strategy 0.31830 0.14122
DJCS Hedge Fund Index 0.32314 0.17476
S&P 500 0.14381 0.02395
The similarities between the Sharpe ratio and the Sortino
ratio rankings may be driven by the similarities in the way thatthe standard deviation and semi-deviation statistics are con-
structed. The Sharpe ratio reflects the dispersion of both high
and low returns around the mean whereas the Sortino ratio
reflects the dispersion of only the low returns around the risk-
free rate. In other words, the latter ratio is focused on the left-
tail of the index return distribution and utilizes a different
benchmark. However, the bottom line is that both risk mea-
sures are based on squared deviations around a target return.
Thus, in this section, we use a more sophisticated measure of
downside risk and investigate whether this measure creates
any changes in our inferences.
Table 11
Calmar ratios for investable hedge fund indices. This table presents
Calmar ratios for various investable hedge fund strategy indices and
a composite investable hedge fund index. For each hedge fund
index, we calculate monthly Calmar ratios as the ratio of the
monthly index return to the maximum drawdown which is defined
as the percentage difference between the highest and the lowest
values of an index during the last 36 months. The table reports the
average of these Calmar ratios. The recent sample is from October
2007 to August 2012.
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downside risk is the value at risk (VaR). VaR attempts to
answer the question of how much an investor can expect to
lose on a portfolio in a given time period at a given level of
probability. For example, if a portfolio of equities has a one-
month 5% VaR of 20 percent, this means that there is a
5% probability that the portfolio value will decline by more
than 20 percent over a one-month period. In our empirical
treatment, we use a parametric measure of VaR which is
constructed in the following way. To account for skewness and
excess kurtosis in the data, Hansen (1994) introduces a
generalization of the Student t-distribution where asymmetries
may occur, while maintaining the assumption of a zero mean
and unit variance. This skewed t (ST) density is given by:
f ðzt;m;s; v;lÞ ¼
8><
>:
bc

1þ 1
v2

bztþa
1l
2vþ12
if zt <a=b
bc

1þ 1
v2

bztþa
1þl
2vþ12
if zt a=b
ð4Þ
where zt ¼ Rtms is the standardized expected market return,
and the constants a, b, and c are given by
a¼ 4lc

v 2
v 1
	
b2 ¼ 1þ 3l2  a2; c¼ G

vþ1
2

ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
pðv 2Þp Gv
2

ð5Þ
Hansen (1994) shows that this density is defined for
2 < v <N and 1 < l < 1. This density has a single mode at
ea/b, which is of opposite sign with the parameter l. Thus, if
l > 0, the mode of the density is to the left of zero and the
variable is skewed to the right, and vice versa when l < 0.
Furthermore, if l ¼ 0, Hansen’s distribution reduces to the
traditional standardized t distribution. If l ¼ 0 and v ¼ N, it
reduces to a normal density.3
The parametric approach to calculating VaR is based on the
lower tail of the ST distribution. Specifically, we estimate the
parameters of the ST density (m, s, y, l) using the past 36
months of return data and then find the corresponding
percentile of the estimated distribution. Assuming that Rt ¼
fv;lðzÞ follows an ST density, parametric VaR is the solution to
ZGSTðFÞ
N
fv;lðzÞdz¼ F ð6Þ3 The parameters of the ST density are estimated by maximizing the log-
likelihood function of Rt with respect to the parameters m, s, y and l:
log L¼ n ln bþ n ln G
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where dt ¼ (bzt þ a)/(1ls) and s is a sign dummy taking the value of 1 if
bzt þ a < 0 and s ¼ 1 otherwise.where GSTðFÞ is the VaR threshold based on the ST density
with a loss probability of F. Equation (6) indicates that VaR
can be calculated by integrating the area under the probability
density function of the ST distribution as in Bali, Demirtas,
and Levy (2009). The degree of significance that we choose
for the value at risk measure is 1%.
Once we calculate a parametric VaR value for each hedge
fund index i for each month t, we calculate the return to value
at risk ratios in a rolling window fashion using the following
formula:
Return to VaRi;t ¼ Ri;t Rf ;tjVaRtj ð7Þ
where Ri;t denotes the average return of the hedge fund index i
during the last 36 months and Rf ;t denotes the risk-free rate at
the end of month t. Absolute values are necessary in the de-
nominator because value at risk is a negative number and we
want to define our risk-adjusted performance measures such
that a higher value corresponds to a better performance.
Our goal in this section is to investigate whether using VaR
as an alternative downside risk measure will change the
comparative risk-adjusted performances of the hedge fund
indices. We will just summarize the similar patterns and
pinpoint the differences if there are any. Table 8 presents re-
turn to VaR ratios for the non-investable DJCS indices. The
magnitudes of these ratios and the magnitudes of the Sortino
ratios in Table 6 are, of course, different. However, the three
indices with the best downside risk-adjusted performances are
still the equity market neutral, distressed restructuring and
global macro indices with return to VaR ratios between 0.376
and 0.838. The three worst performers are again the dedicated
short bias, managed futures and emerging markets indices
with return to VaR ratios between 0.045 and 0.098. DJCS
Hedge Fund index would rank ninth among the strategyRecent sample
Event Driven 0.13405
Long/Short Equity Hedge 0.00073
Equity Market Neutral 0.12069
Dedicated Short Bias 0.14343
Convertible Arbitrage 0.01113
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.14794
Global Macro 0.06842
Emerging Markets 0.03410
Managed Futures 0.29575
Multi-Strategy 0.00537
DJCS AllHedge Index 0.03546
S&P 500 0.03216
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index again underperforms all strategy indices except dedi-
cated short bias. In the recent sample, the three indices with
improved downside risk-adjusted performances are again the
merger/risk arbitrage, dedicated short bias and managed fu-
tures indices. The indices that stand out with their high return
to VaR ratios are the equity market neutral index and the
indices under the event driven category. The worst performers
are again the long/short equity hedge and dedicated short bias
strategies in the equity hedge category and the convertible
arbitrage and fixed income arbitrage indices in the relative
value category. For the investable DJCS indices presented in
Table 9, the only strategy that exhibits a better investable index
performance compared to Table 8 is the managed futures
strategy which also has the highest return to VaR ratio of
0.096. Other indices with high return to VaR ratios are multi-
strategy and event driven indices. The equity hedge and rela-
tive value categories again populate the bottom of the rank-
ings. To summarize, our inferences from Tables 8 and 9 are
very similar to our inferences from the Sortino ratio results.
The rankings based on value-at-risk parallel those that are
based on semi-deviation as a risk measure. It seems that the
point raised by Eling and Schuhmacher (2007) is valid for
hedge fund indices and in a more recent sample period.4.4. Calmar ratioAnother common risk measure used in the asset manage-
ment industry is the drawdown. Drawdown reflects the per-
centage decline in the value of an asset or an index from its
historical peak or highest level. A behavioral interpretation of
drawdown is the regret that an investor would feel for not
selling an asset at its peak or redeeming his or her capital from
a fund at its most valuable point. We calculate a measure
called the maximum drawdown as the percentage difference
between the highest and the lowest values of a hedge fund
index during the last 36 months. Then, we construct a Calmar
ratio for each hedge fund index i for each month t in the
following way:
Calmar Ratioi;t ¼ Ri;t
MaximumDrawdownt
ð8Þ
where Ri;t denotes the annualized return that hedge fund index
i generates during the last 36 months. Maximum drawdown is
sensitive to the estimation methodology. If the frequency of
the measurement interval is smaller or the time-series for
which maximum drawdown is computed is longer, the
maximum drawdown statistic will be mechanically larger. Our
methodology ensures that the maximum drawdown statistics
are comparable across indices. Again, since we calculate
monthly Calmar ratios for each index, the tables will report the
time-series arithmetic averages of these Calmar ratios. In our
earlier discussions, we pointed out that rankings based on
Sortino and return to VaR ratios produce similar results to each
other as well as to the Sharpe ratio rankings. Our goal here is
to explore whether the comparison of the Calmar ratio to theSharpe ratio results in similar rank ordering across hedge fund
indices.
Table 10 presents Calmar ratios for non-investable DJCS
hedge fund indices. In the full sample, the highest Calmar ratio
is equal to 0.362 and it belongs to the global macro index
which ranks third based on Sharpe ratios in Table 4. The
second and third highest Calmar ratios belong to the merger/
risk arbitrage and multi-strategy event driven indices which
rank eighth and sixth based on Sharpe ratios, respectively. In
other words, there are some index changes at the top of the
rankings and some funds exhibit upward mobility based on
Calmar ratios. Aside from the merger/risk arbitrage index,
other indices in the event driven category also exhibit favor-
able performance. The event driven and distressed restructur-
ing indices have Calmar ratios of 0.335 and 0.325,
respectively. The long/short equity and equity market neutral
indices are positioned in the middle with Calmar ratios of
0.293 and 0.263. The three indices with the lowest Sharpe
ratios in Table 4 are the dedicated short bias, managed futures
and emerging markets indices and these indices are again at
the bottom in the Calmar ratio rankings. So, it is not possible
to talk about a radically different rank ordering among hedge
fund indices. DJCS Hedge Fund index would rank sixth
among the strategy indices and the S&P 500 index can only
outperform the dedicated short bias index with its Calmar ratio
of 0.144. In the recent sample, the dedicated short bias and
managed futures indices improve their Calmar ratios as was
the case for the other risk-adjusted performance metrics. The
global macro index is the top performer, the indices under the
event driven category perform favorably and the indices under
the equity hedge and relative value categories populate the
bottom half of the rankings. One particular index that visibly
climbs up the rankings in the recent period is the managed
futures index which gains seven spots and moves into the third
rank with a Calmar ratio of 0.276.
Table 11 presents Calmar ratios for investable DJCS hedge
fund indices. All of the investable indices, except the managed
futures index, have lower Calmar ratios compared to their non-
investable counterparts. The managed futures index has the
highest Calmar ratio which is equal to 0.296. The event driven,
global macro and emerging markets indices perform strongly
whereas the indices under the equity hedge and relative value
categories perform weakly. The investable DJCS AllHedge
index has a Calmar ratio of 0.035 which is one fifth of that of
the non-investable DJCS Hedge Fund index. However, DJCS
AllHedge index would still rank fourth among all investable
strategy indices. S&P 500 index has a negative average
Calmar ratio of 0.032 which is greater than those of only
three strategy indices.
The remarkable thing about all these results is that the
patterns are very similar to what we observe in Tables 4 and 5
for Sharpe ratios. Aside from some particular exceptions
detailed above, most hedge fund indices do not move more
than one or two spots in the Calmar ratio rankings. We could
have copied and pasted our discussion for Sharpe ratios here
and it would have been hard to spot the inconsistencies. The
risk measure in the denominator of the Calmar ratio is a
52 Y. Atilgan et al. / Borsa I_stanbul Review 13 (2013) 30e52percentage range and this simple measure produces virtually
the same rankings as the Sharpe ratio which has the standard
deviation in its denominator.
5. Conclusion
This study provides a comprehensive investigation of how
various strategy-specific and composite hedge fund indices have
performed over the last 20 years. There are two dimensions of the
performance of any financial asset, namely its risk and return.
One cannot make sense of one attribute without having knowl-
edge about the other. Therefore, we begin our empirical treatment
by present risk and return characteristics for a wide range of
hedge fund indices. This analysis makes it clear that returns for
most hedge fund indices are highly volatile and deviate from
normality as suggested by their left-skewed and leptokurtic dis-
tributions. Next, we present different measures of risk and
calculate alternative reward-to-risk ratios for each index. Hedge
funds are known to engage in nonlinear investment strategies and
thus, some of the risk measures we construct are particularly
appealing for hedge funds as they take how much value a hedge
fund index can losewith respect to a previous high or as a result of
an extreme event into account. We compare the reward-to-risk
ratios both across hedge fund indices and with respect to a
broad equity index. Our analysis also distinguishes between
investable and noninvestable hedge fund indices because non-
investable indices may reflect the returns of hedge funds that
are closed to investors and the more recently introduced invest-
able indices can provide a better picture of returns that hedge fund
investors can actually realize. Finally, we analyze how hedge
fund performance has changed over the years with a special focus
on the recent global financial crisis. There are several major re-
sults that emerge from this analysis. First, we find that the risk-
adjusted performances of most hedge fund indices deteriorate
over time. Second, most hedge fund indices have highly negative
returns during crisis periods which raises questions about the
absolute return focus and diversification benefits of investing in
hedge funds. Third, non-investable indices outperform investable
indices on a risk-adjusted basis. Fourth, a majority of the hedge
fund indices outperform the overall equity market. Finally, using
alternative risk metrics in the calculation of risk-adjusted per-
formances does not cause a dramatic change in the rank ordering
of the hedge fund indices.
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